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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
The majority of the Court may be setting a new trend in its novel approach
to the mechanics of effecting a citizen's arrest. The language of the statute
seems to be explicit: "an arrest is made by the actual restraint of the person of
the defendant or by his submission to the custody of the officer," 5 and cases
uphold as valid a citizen's arrest in which the citizen physically subdues the
wrongdoer. 6 However, a lower court case, People v. Stewart,7 presents the
theory, similar to that advanced in the present case, of constructive arrest in
which physical restraint by the citizen making the arrest is not necessary. In
People v. Stewart, a policeman, called to investigate a family brawl, arrested
the husband for assaulting his wife. Although the arrest was legal on other
grounds, the court said in dictum that a valid citizen's arrest could have been
effected by the wife for the assault committed upon her before the arrival of
the policeman by her demanding the arrest of her husband when the policeman
did arrive. It is difficult to see how either the wife in People v. Stewart or
Mrs. Salzberg in the present case were physically capable of restraining her
assailant to perfect a technical arrest. By creating a fictional citizen's arrest,
the court is sanctioning an arrest made by a police officer upon the mere unsworn
complaint of the injury party. 0
The Court (majority) seems to be stretching the law to reach a desirable
result. Many victims have an understandable and often justifiable fear of
retaliation if they swear out a warrant against their assailant. The result is
that many grievances go unalleviated. Also there are many instances in which
the assailant, immune from arrest because the police officer was not present
when the misdemeanor was committed, departs, and since he is unknown to
those present, a warrant may not be obtained. Although the decision more
adequately meets present day law enforcement needs, there is a possibility that
the Court is usurping a legislative function in changing the existing laws as
to arrest for a misdemeanor.
P. A. L.
SINGLE OCCURRENCE SATISFIES COMMON GAMBLING AND BOOKMAKING RE-
QUIREMENTS
Is one transaction or a single occasion sufficient to satisfy a requirement of
"professionalism" under the New York bookmaking and common gambling
statutes? The Court of Appeals in two recent decisions, People ex rel. Guido v.
Calkins8 and People v. Pavia,9 regarded a single occasion sufficient to warrant
convictions.
In the Guido case, relator was convicted in the Schenectady Police Court
of aiding and abetting in the operation of a particular gambling establishment.
S. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 171.
6. See Bellinger v. State, 206 Misc. 575, 134 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. Cl. 1954); People v.
Ostrosky, 95 Misc. 104, 160 N.Y. Supp. 493 (County Ct. 1916).
7. 183 Misc. 212, 47 N.Y.S.2d 349 (City Ct. 1944).
8. 9 N.Y.2d 77, 211 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1961).
9. 8 N.Y.2d 333, 207 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1960).
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In a habeas corpus proceeding, he contended that the information charging him
was defective because it had alleged a single occasion rather than a continuity
of action necessary to distinguish casual from common gambling, the latter, a
misdemeanor under Section 970 of the Penal Law.' 0 The Schenectady County
Court dismissed the writ, and the Appellate Division reversed on the law alone. 1
The Court of Appeals held that an information charging defendant with aiding
and abetting in the operation of a gambling establishment need not aver more
than one occasion.
In the Pavia case, defendant was convicted of bookmaking under Section
986 of the Penal Law.'2 Defendant argued that a single transaction was only
circumstantial evidence and of little relevance, since one occasion was just as
consistent with a finding of guilt as of innocence. The Schenectady County
Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the information,"3 and the People
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court held that all the facts and the
inferences therefrom surrounding the one bookmaking transaction were sufficient
to convict defendant under the statute.
"Professionalism" is what distinguishes a casual from a common gambler
and what defines a bookmaker. Constitutional provision against gaming and
gambling in New York has never been directed at casual betting or gaming.14
Thus, in applying Sections 970 and 986, one finds variations in meeting require-
ments of a violation on a professional basis.
The type of game or gambling, and the frequency, custom, and habit of
participation as a player determine a common gambler. 15 A defendant charged
as a player under Section 970 would necessarily escape prosecution if he were
involved in no more than one participation; whereas, one charged as a game-
keeper becomes a common gambler within the statute upon a single partaking
as distinguished from an unpunishable casual player.'6 Likewise, any one
occasion of running a gambling house is sufficient to bring a case within the
statute.'7 However, to determine whether a violation of Section 986 has been
committed is a question of weighing the probative effect of circumstantial
evidence in order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The probative
effect, of course, depends on the totality of facts shown concerning the collecting
10. N.Y. Penal Law § 970 provides that a person who is an owner or agent of a place
for gambling, or who hires or allows a room to be used for such purpose, or who engages
as dealer, gamekeeper, or player in any gambling game, or who sells or offers to sell lottery
policies is a common gambler and guilty of a misdemeanor.
11. 10 A.D.2d 510, 200 N.Y.S.2d 907 (3d Dep't 1960).
12. N.Y. Penal Law § 986 provides that a person who engages in bookmaking or
registers bets or makes book upon the result of a contest of skill or speed, or receives,
registers, records, or forwards in any manner whatsoever any money bet or wagered or
offered to bet or wager is guilty of a misdemeanor.
13. 20 Misc. 2d 846, 198 N.Y.S.2d 141 (County Ct. 1960).
14. N.Y. Const. art. I § 9. See People v. Bright, 203 N.Y. 73, 96 N.E. 362 (1911).
15. People v. Bright, supra note 14 at 78, 96 N.E. at 364.
16. People on inf. Roberts v. Reille, 50 N.Y.S.2d 196 (City Ct. 1944).
17. Hitchins v. People, 39 N.Y. 454 (1868) under a similar statute.
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of bets even on one occasion. The conviction in the Pavia case, a "typical
streetcorner observation case," is justified on the evidence: defendant accepted
money for a previous bet and accepted more for nine additional bets which he
agreed to place. Such facts constitute a continuity of practice on a professional
basis, the degree forbidden by the statute.
Thus, the only time the distinction between casual and common gambler
has any significance as far as continuity of action is concerned is when the
defendant is charged as a player. Likewise, the test of bookmaking is not
whether there was only an isolated transaction, but whether or not the facts
constitute a professional gambling transaction.
It might be noted further that the Court in the Guido case took a most
liberal view in determining the sufficiency of the information. Only the words
that relator did "aid and abet in the operation of a gambling establishment"
characterized the specific acts constituting the crime;18 however, the Court of
Appeals held that such words, as a matter of law, should not be deemed in-
sufficient, since the ultimate facts were set forth in the information. Granted,
that, as a general proposition of law, an information does not have to be framed
with the same exactness as a grand jury indictment, 19 but the purpose of each
remains identical: to inform the accused of what he is being called upon to
defend and to prevent his being tried again for the same offense.20 Surely, an
information charging that relator did "aid and abet in the operation of a
gambling establishment" does not apprise the defendant of the act the People
intend to prove.21
It would seem that where a statute sets out, in detail and specificity, certain
acts which would constitute a violation of the statute, as does Section 970, an
information should, by the same token, state the act defendant is accused of
with exactness. Moreover, Section 970 may be violated in any number of ways:
by allowing or hiring a room to be used for gambling; by owning or superintend-
ing a place used for gambling; by engaging as a player, dealer, gamekeeper;
or selling lottery policies or any writing in the nature of a bet. In these and
other ways, relator may have committed acts or aided one committing them
in violation of the statute, but none is set forth in the information. The nature
of the offense, here, demands that the charge state the act constituting the crime
without ambiguity.22
E. J. S.
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER, ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
MUST BE PROVED TO A MoRAL CERTAINTY
On the night of August 30, 1959, Salvatore Agron, Louis Hernandez, and
18. E.g., People v. Goldstein, 295 N.Y. 61, 65 N.E.2d 169 (1947).
19. See People v. Knapp, 152 Misc. 368, 274 N.Y. Supp. 85 (County Ct. 1934), aff'd,
242 App. Div. 811, 275 N.Y. Supp. 637 (Ist Dep't 1934).
20. Cf. People v. Zambounis, 251 N.Y. 94, 96, 167 N.E. 183, 184 (1929).
21. Cf. People v. Corbalis, 178 N.Y. 516, 71 N.E. 106 (1904) (case concerning
sufficiency of an indictment).
22. Ibid.
